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Gurkha Soldiers as an Intercultural Moment on the European Battlefields of the Great War 
Frank JACOB 
!
The centennial of the First World War in 2014 created a high impact for research of the events 
between 1914 and 1918.   However, the perspective remained a mainly European one, as it can be i
seen by having a look in the Cambridge History of the First World War  , which covers mainly the ii
European aspects of the Great War. Despite this partially still existing Euro-centrism with regard to 
the events of the “seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century,“   research on colonial spheres and iii
the use of colonial troops   in the international campaigns are especially important to show the iv
transnational impact of the events during the war years.  
 The British Empire and its multiethnic colonial sphere had created many different colonial 
elite troops, whose members were recruited in Africa  , the Punjab  , and especially Nepal  . The last v vi vii
named country provided countless generations of young men to fight and die for the sake of the 
British Empire, and military historians as well as those who served as officers in the British army 
know that the so-called Gurkhas have been an elite troop inside the British Indian Army for more 
than one and a half centuries.  
 Since the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-1816),   the soldiers of Great Britain have been aware viii
of the military potential of these Nepalese warriors.   When Britain sent 22,000 men to Nepal, they ix
had to face an enemy that was not just willing but effectively able to resist the ambitions of the 
Empire. After three attempts and the use of the assembled strength of its military system, the British 
campaign was finally successful in 1816. The peace treaty signed with the Nepalese ruler on 4 
March of the same year finally ended the conflict but also provided the right to the victorious 
British Empire to recruit soldiers from the small Asian country, neighbored by India and China. The 
war and the fierce fighting of the Nepalese Gurkhas “left each side with an increased respect for the 
other”  , and the British officers were more than happy for the opportunity to fill their ranks with the x
strong and talented warriors, who seemed to be more than equal to be used against the Afghan 
tribes. The Gurkhas proved their talent in countless campaigns on the different parts of the Indian-
Afghan border  , where the regiments had to secure British hegemony for more than a century.  xi
 In the following decades, the Gurkhas became a fundamental part of the British Indian Army 
serving in the North-West as well as the North-East Frontier of the British Indian Empire, where 
they remained in loyal support of its aims and its majesty even during the Indian Mutiny   in 1857. xii
The Gurkhas seemed to be the most loyal soldiers because there were almost no desertions and even 
when the rebellious forces pleaded for assistance, they remained loyal to their British officers. 
During the last two centuries, whole generations of Gurkhas have served as part of the regiments of 
the British Indian Army. Even if their main reason for joining the British army might have been a 
financial one, the stories of heroism and martiality, “stories of their prowess in battle, particularly 
with their short curved knives, called kukris, with the cutting edge on the inside and the notched 
phallus on the blade”  , would become a major part of their legend. Almost every British officer xiii
who had served with a Gurkha regiment would state that those soldiers were the bravest troops of 
the whole Empire. As a consequence, many officers were willing to serve at least some years as part 
of a Gurkha regiment in the British Indian Army – the higher pay in this part of the world might 
have been a driving force as well. However, not many achieved this aim especially since those 
officers who wanted to serve in a Gurkha regiment would have to learn the Nepalese language of 
Khas Kura. To be fully accepted by the soldiers meant to be understood by them: 
!
The surprise and delight of the Gurkha officers and men at hearing their own dialect spoken by an officer of (…) 
high rank, and the way their faces lighted up, would be ample reward for the trouble taken ver “Khas Kura“.   xiv
!
 Gurkhas, originally meaning 'cow protectors', was a term that just described the people of 
Mongolian origin who lived in the Nepalese hills and were part of the warrior class of the small 
Asian country.  This term thus became synonymous for bravery and heroism. Stories of the brave 
Gurkhas can consequently be found with regard to all major wars of the 20th century  , and even xv
their enemies acknowledged this and described them as “transparently honest men, very brave 
sticklers for regulations – the very model of sturdy, honest and simple soldiers”  . It is true that xvi
“their military skills and bravery are rightly admired”  , and almost every soldier or officer who xvii
met a Gurkha himself was charmed by their simple but friendly habits. Many British officers were 
attracted by the service of these short Nepalese soldiers and their constant contact with their former 
comrades in arms.   It were these Asian soldiers who were described as tremendously brave when xviii
they were fighting and dying for the honor of the British Empire, especially on so many battlefields 
during the Great War 1914-1918.    xix
 The following article will trace the role of the First World War in the creation of the heroic 
and transnational image of the Gurkha soldiers, who were recognized not only by their British 
officers but also by their enemies, who recognized that these Asian soldiers were especially skillful 
when killing Germans or Turks with their kukris on the Western or Middle Eastern front.   In the xx
first section, I will provide a short survey of the battlefields of the Great War where the Gurkha 
soldiers were sent. This should also affirm that the decision to bring them into the game could be 
wise, but also absurd, depending on the characters of the battlefield itself. In the second section, I 
will point out the effect of the global influence of the small but brave soldiers to show that the Great 
War was responsible for the long lasting myth of the military skills and the heroic bravery of the 
Gurkha soldiers. 
!
The Great War 
!
When the First World War broke out in 1914, the British Indian Army immediately began to 
mobilize, and in contrast to the Second World War, there were no antagonist Gandhi   and no peace xxi
movement that might have slowed down the Indian support for the war cause because such a 
movement would have caused problems with regard to an Indian participation in the war scenario. 
In August 1914, the Indian Army, therefore, started its own mobilization to send troops to support 
the British. Nepal also remained a loyal ally of the British rulers, not only sending money and 
weapons in support of the British Indian Army but also recruiting more than 200,000 Gurkhas to the 
British regiments, leaving the hills of Nepal without its male population. The Great War, in general, 
mobilized the whole human potential of the colonial empires, bringing not only soldiers but also 
workers   from all around the globe to the European battlefields, where the non-Europeans were xxii
supposed to fight and die for the causes of their colonial rulers. The Gurkha soldiers were 
assembled into ten infantry regiments of the British Indian Army and sent to different battlefields of 
the Great War, where 10% of these men were going to die what was later called to be an honorable 
death. The Asian soldiers “certainly were not consciously fighting to preserve Western civilization 
or to make the world safe for democracy”   but were rather longing for honor and glory or pay and xxiii
pension or were just waging the fight because they were told to do so by their officers. It is 
definitely hard to generalize the motives of the Nepalese men who fought for the sake of the British 
Empire. While some of them might at first instance have been just interested in the good payment, 
others could have served the cause of the war just as a consequence of tradition. In many Gurkha 
families, more than one generation had served in the British service before, so the young men in 
1914 could also have seen a possibility to proceed with the family tradition. Despite their personal 
willingness to fight, they might have been surprised when they were confronted with the new and 
modernized way of warfare in the trenches of the Western front.    xxiv
 In contrast to the mobilized warfare in the colonial spheres where the Gurkhas had been 
brave and reliable soldiers, the battlefields in France just offered trench warfare, where the amount 
of artillery seemed to be more important than the right fighting spirit.   Due to the lack of xxv
movement during the campaigns, the Gurkhas were not able to become an effective weapon against 
the enemies. 
 On 29 October 1914, the first Gurkhas reached Europe. When the 28th Regiment was 
ordered into battle, the danger of losing almost a whole generation of Gurkha men was as high as 
within other regiments. The so-called “lost generation“   of the First World War, was as Nepalese xxvi
as it had been Australian, British, Canadian or European. Facing the modern face of warfare, no 
level of bravery could have been sufficient to overcome a heavy artillery just by will and spirit. 
Consequently, the very successful soldiers of the British Indian Army had no chance to gain a 
victory in France, and after 13 months, the Indian Corps was transferred to the North-West Frontier 
again. The harsh climate, the size of the trenches and the logistic problems regarding sufficient 
Indian food supplies made the Nepalese soldiers unsuitable for the war planning of a European 
campaign. Regardless of these facts and despite the outcome that the Gurkhas were not able to 
provide a British victory, the soldiers from Nepal were well received as a positive aspect of Britain's 
Asian Empire because neither the civil population nor the British officers could complain about 
them.  
 It had simply been a mistake to send the Gurkha regiments to France, where the climatic and 
geographic environment as well as the trench warfare was just unsuitable for the fighting style of 
the Gurkha soldiers. Geography, climate and the way of warfare had their specific impact on the 
usability of traditional colonial troops who were used to the fighting style on the Indian-Afghan 
border region and not to a trench war. As a consequence of this miscalculation of the British 
military, many young Gurkhas lost their lives during the 13 months at the Western front of the First 
World War. They were sent to support the French and British contingents , yet the Gurkhas were 
never able to succeed there. They arrived poorly equipped and had to face hunger, cold, mud, 
dampness and trenches that were too deep for the short soldiers from Nepal.   Despite the bad xxvii
conditions in their new fighting environment, the Gurkhas kept up their morale and tried to give 
their best. Many of the soldiers as well as their officers died, shot like flies by the better equipped 
German troops who were using machine guns to drown their enemies in a sea of blood. When the 
Gurkhas participated in the British offensive at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, they had to face the 
same fate as the European soldiers before them. They were dying in great numbers, and over just a 
few minutes, whole regiments were erased from the course of history. 
 Due to the rather unsuitable environment, it, therefore, is no wonder that the Gurkhas would 
receive more fame on other battlefields of the global war because other scenes of the global war 
provided better stages for the “art of Gurkha warfare“.  
 Therefore, another place would become more glorious for these Nepalese men. All ten 
Gurkha regiments sent at least one battalion to Mesopotamia, an important sphere of the Great 
War  , even though the European powers regarded this battlefield as a minor sideline of the war xxviii
theater. With special regard to the large amount of Muslims living in the British Empire, the success 
or failure of the British forces in this region was decisive for a large part of the colonial territories 
of Great Britain especially since Turkey had proclaimed the beginning of a holy war in late 1914. 
General Sir John Nixon (1857-1921) was requested to secure lower Mesopotamia against the Turks, 
but driven by his thirst for fame, he developed an obsession for the seizure of Baghdad  , which xxix
would cost a lot of soldiers their lives. He sent 11,000 men against the Turks at Kut-el-Amara,  xxx
and when the troops were able to defeat the Turks, they were ordered to proceed against Baghdad. 
However, the British forces were not able to continue the victories of the beginning of the campaign 
and had to return to Kut on 3 December. After several days of hard fighting, they had to retreat from 
there as well. The retreat from there was a shock for the British Empire that took two months for the 
British army to recover from. Then the 2nd Gurkhas   crossed the Tigris, built a strong bridgehead xxxi
and reopened the march on Baghdad again. Later, they were involved in the re-occupation of Kut-
al-Amara and  when the British took Baghdad in March 1917. The war in Mesopotamia seemed to 
be rather successful, compared to the Western Front in Europe, a fact that was also a consequence 
of the fighting tactics, which were rather based on movement and mobility, in the Middle East. In 
September 1918, General Allenby and the 27th Gurkha Regiment defeated the Turks at Megiddo  , xxxii
securing British success at this stage of the Great War. The high temperatures, thirst and sand were 
not as problematic as the rainy trenches of France, and the Gurkhas provided a vital part of the 
British success in Mesopotamia.  The battles in partly mountainous environments, the drier climate 
and the moving battles were better suited for the small Nepalese soldiers, who were trained and 
used to this kind of battle by their experiences on the Indian-Afghan border in the years before. 
However, another battle would make them famous forever. The decisive battle of Gallipoli  xxxiii
should become a synonymous term not only for military failure but also for Gurkha bravery. The 
events at Gallipoli not only impacted the creation and strengthening of an Australian nationalism 
but also established the since ever told myth of the brave Gurkha, fighting for the British Empire. 
By meeting other colonial troops, e.g. from Australia, and showing greater interest in each other, as 
visible in the photograph in Figure 1 of an Australian soldier with his Nepalese comrades posing 
with their kukris, the image of the Gurkha as an emblematic figure for bravery and chivalry was 
spread even further. 
 However, the campaign on the Gallipoli Peninsula would finally create a myth that lasted 
ever since with regard to the kukri using Gurkha soldiers. The Battle of Gallipoli was “one of the 
most moving and tragic campaigns in all history, tragic not only in the severe loss of life but 
because from the British point of view, priceless opportunities were thrown away after the first 
landings on 25 April 1915”  . Despite the image of military failure, General Ian Hamilton xxxiv
(1853-1947) decided well when he asked Lord Kitchener for some Gurkha troops for his campaign 
because he was sure that “each little 'Gurk' might be worth his full weight in gold at 
Gallipoli” (Farwell, 96). He received the 15th, 16th and 210th Gurkha Regiments, which then became 
part of the 78,000 men who were going to land on the Mediterranean peninsula. (Figure 2) They 
would encounter 60,000 Turks, led by the German general Otto Liman van Sanders (1855-1929)  xxxv
as well as Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), who were able to cause severe casualties on the Allied side, 
especially with regard to the ANZAC troops. The Gurkha troops did not arrive until the fifth day of 
the campaign, and they were successful in the beginning when the so-called Gurkha bluff became a 
victorious assault on a high Turkish stronghold. In a campaign due to which victories were rather 
rare, the attempt of the Nepalese soldiers and their success were able to be used to create a new 
legend of chivalry in the bloody sand of the beaches of Gallipoli.  
 The Gurkhas also participated in the third battle at Krithia, but even these Nepalese soldiers 
were not able to seize the Achi Baba Hill, where the Turks caused another 7,000 casualties. The 
planners of the British military staff had underestimated the strength of the Turkish enemy and the 
hardship that would be presented by the geographical environment at Gallipoli. While the British 
troops were landing on the wide beaches, the Turkish troops used machine gun fire to kill the 
landing soldiers, who had to debark from the transporting ships before seeking concealment. Those 
who were able to survive the landing had to mount the cliffs of the peninsula to face the Turks, but 
until they got there, most of them were killed or wounded already.  
 Consequently, in the first five weeks of the campaign (25 April 1915 - 9 January 1916), the 
210th Gurkha Regiment lost 70% of their officers and 40% of all soldiers. These numbers were no 
exceptions because other regiments lost a lot of their men as well. In August, the short Nepalese 
soldiers were also participating in an assault against Hill Q, but they were not able to seize the hill 
for long. The British navy mistakenly opened fire on them, forcing Major C. J. L. Allanson and his 
troops to retreat again and the Turks to re-occupy the hill. After many brave soldiers from New 
Zealand, Australia and Nepal had died in the campaign and many more had become victims of cold 
weather, for which they had not been prepared appropriately, at the end of 1915 (Fig.4), the British 
military leaders commanded a retreat.  
 Even though the Gurkhas were not successful in gaining a complete victory on the 
peninsula, during this important military campaign, “Gallipoli“ became an expression of Gurkha 
bravery and honor. All in all, the First World War, with its high losses of human lives intermingled 
with the fearless attempts of the small Nepalese soldiers, created a myth: the myth of the elite force 
of the Gurkha soldiers. This force would never stop an assault no matter how dangerous the 
situation would be. A lot of British officers who had served with these Nepalese soldiers wrote their 
memoirs   or other stories of Gurkha bravery in the aftermath of the Great War, thereby xxxvi




There are just a small number of soldiers who are really prepared for the cruel image a modern and 
real war is going to present to them. The cruelties of the First World War were especially 
frightening and traumatizing. Men like Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) were able to at least give an 
impression of this modern warfare: 
!
What was that about? War had shown its claws, and stripped off its mask of cosiness. It was all so strange, so 
impersonal. We had barely begun to think about the enemy that mysterious, treacherous being somewhere. This 
event, so far beyond anything we had experienced, made such a powerful impression on us that it was difficult to 
understand what had happened. It was like a ghostly manifestation in broad daylight.   xxxvii
!
The noise, confusion, blood, horror and a too real fear are sometimes more than a human being 
could ever expect to meet in the trenches or on the battlefield, not only in the “hell of Verdun“. 
Furthermore, the physical and psychological attrition as a consequence of cumulative filth and 
fatigue could be too harsh for young men dreaming of a better future. Experiencing death in all its 
possible and cruel ways traumatized a whole generation.  It made them ill. However, the Gurkhas 
had shown that they were reliable soldiers who were always eager to do their duty even if the 
chances to survive were minimal. They attacked no matter how high or low their chances for 
victory would be. Ironically, they made the “perfect soldiers“.  
 With the end of the First World War, due to which they had received their international 
baptism of fire, no wise man would again question the challenge of a Gurkha regiment without 
sufficient preparation. The harmless image of the short soldiers did not exist anymore. The men 
who had even joked about death and the modern expression of Western civilization (e.g. planes) 
were described and praised in countless memoirs, regimental histories, diaries and 
autobiographies.   The Gurkhas were described as a visible expression of masculine heroes in xxxviii
the battles of the Great War. These men were the resemblance of bravery, but only a courageous 
British officer was able to lead the men to victory.   Consequently, it was the might of the white xxxix
British officers to channel the brute force of the most valued soldiers of the Empire in battle. The 
image of the brave Gurkha was thereby not able to overcome racist and chauvinist assumptions or 
prejudices although it was able to show that the colored part of the British Army was of tremendous 
importance. In contrast to other colonial subordinates, the Gurkhas were seen as a fighting race who 
received the respect of their British masters who recognized themselves in the bravery of the 
Gurkha soldiers.  
 However, the experience of the Gurkhas did even more for many other people. It was able to 
show that there were Asian people who were as strong, as brave, and as loyal as Western soldiers. 
Due to this, the participation of the Nepalese soldiers during the European war helped to overcome 
the stereotypes of uncivilized and weak Asians, who must have been protected themselves. On the 
other hand, this image was used by the British officers in their memoirs to defend the mission of 
British imperialism as well because it was the impact of Western rule that made the high potential 
of the Nepalese soldiers available.  
 Despite this Western interpretation, the bloody victories changed the reception of Asia in 
many ways and that of Nepal and its brave soldiers in particular. It seems to be ironic, but by 
sharing the deadly experiences of the Great War, the soldiers in British regiments related to each 
other on the same level: as bleeding and dying soldiers ready to be killed in the name of honor and 
glory for the British Empire.  
!
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